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THE PROPOSED JUDICIALLY APPOINTED INDEPENDENT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC ATTORNEY: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL
OBJECTIONS AND AN ALTERNATIVE
by
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.*
THE Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities,' which
for better or worse will be recorded in history as the Senate Watergate
Committee, recommended the enactment of legislation in a number of areas
in its final report on presidential campaign activities. 2 The first, and perhaps
principal recommendation by the committee was the establishment of a
permanent Office of Public Attorney, with the Public Attorney to be
appointed for a fixed term by members of the judicial branch, with the
advice and consent of the Senate.3 Senate Bill 495, the Watergate Reorgani-
zation and Reform Act of 1975,4 introduced on January 30, 1975, is a
multifaceted bill essentially designed to incorporate the recommendations
contained in the committee's final report. Section 101 of S. 495 implements
the committee's recommendation as to the establishment of the Office of
Public Attorney. It is certainly the most controversial provision of this
legislation,5 primarily because it poses serious constitutional questions, spe-
* LL.B., University of Tennessee. United States Senator from Tennessee.
1. The Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities was created by S.
Res. 60, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which was agreed to on February 7, 1973. The
committee was charged with the principal task of making an investigation and study "of
the extent . . . to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities" occurred in the 1972
presidential campaign and election, and to determine whether new legislation is needed
"to safeguard the electoral process by which the President of the United States is
chosen." S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(a) (1973).
2. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, FINAL
REPORT, S. REP. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 96-106, 211-13, 442-44, 563-77, 1071-
74, 1084-86 (1974).
3. Id. at 96. But see id. at 1105 (individual views of Senator Howard H. Baker,
Jr.), 1171 (individual views of Senator Edward J. Gurney). Senator Gurney and this
writer both dissented from the committee's recommendation, the author recommending
the "[e]stablishment of an Office of Public Prosecutor within the Department of Justice,
appointed by the President for a fixed term and subject to Senate confirmation." Id. at
1105.
4. S. 495, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 495]. This bill was
introduced by Senators Abraham Ribicoff, Charles H. Percy, et al., and referred to the
Senate Committee on Government Operations. As yet unpublished hearings on S. 495
were conducted by the Government Operations Committee on July 29, 30, and 31, 1975,
with further hearings to follow. For additional views on this legislation, see WATERGATE
REORGANIZATION AND REFORM ACT OF 1975, PERSPECTIVES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL AND
ACADEMIC COMMUNITIES ON S. 495, 94TH CONGRESS, lST SESS. (Gov't Op. Comm. Print,
May 1975) which contains the replies of various members of the American legal and
academic communities to a letter from Senators Abraham Ribicoff and Charles Percy,
February 20, 1975, inviting comment on S. 495 [hereinafter cited as PERSPECTIVES ON S.
495].
A virtually identical bill was introduced by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman of
both the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and the Committee on
Government Operations, just prior to his retirement at the conclusion of the Ninety-Third
Congress. See S. 4227, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
5. Other recommendations made by the committee which are incorporated in S.
495, include, inter alia, provision for the establishment of a Congressional Legal Service,
establishment of stringent financial disclosure requirements for the President and the
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cifically in relation to the doctrine of separation of powers. This Article
focuses upon the constitutional and practical deficiencies of this proposal,
and in light thereof offers an alternative designed to present a sound and
constitutionally valid response to the institutional deficiencies which surfaced
during and after the original Watergate investigation by the Department of
Justice.
I. PROVISIONS AND HERITAGE OF SENATE BILL 495
The Office of Public Attorney as proposed in S. 495 would operate "as an
independent establishment of the Government"6 under the direction of a
Public Attorney appointed, with the advice and consent of the Senate, by a
panel of three retired court of appeals judges designated by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. 7 The bill provides 'that the Public Attorney shall serve
a first term of five years, may be reappointed for an additional term, and
must agree in writing, prior to assumption of his office, not to seek election to
federal office or to accept other government employment for five years after
the cessation of his service as Public Attorney.8 The Public Attorney would
possess primary and preemptory jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute (1)
allegations of corruption in the administration of the law by the executive
branch; (2) cases referred by the Attorney General because of actual or
potential conflict of interest; (3) criminal cases referred by the Federal
Election Commission; and (4) allegations of violation of federal election
laws. 9 Once the Public Attorney has asserted his jurisdiction and notified the
Attorney General to that effect, the Attorney General, under S. 495, would
be required to direct the Justice Department to refrain from any related
investigation or prosecution, unless prior written approval is given by the
Public Attorney.' 0
The origins of the proposal to establish a judicially appointed, permanent
Public Attorney operating independently of the Department of Justice were
Vice President, prohibition of political contributions by executive agency employees,
application of the Hatch Act to the Department of Justice, prohibition of ad hoc
intelligence activities by executive office personnel, restriction of White House access to
tax returns, clarification of the investigative authorities of congressional committees,
upgrading of criminal penalties for campaign-related violations, and explicitly making
certain questionable campaign activities unlawful. S. 495, §§ 102-405.
6. S. 495, § 101(a). Section 101(a) would amend title 28 of the United States
Code by adding a new chapter 38 containing the following sections: § 581. Establish-
ment of Office of Public Attorney; § 582. Jurisdiction; § 583. Powers; § 584. Notifica-
tion to Attorney General of initiation of prosecution; and § 585. Administrative
provisions.
7. S. 495, § 101(a).
8. Id. (proposed § 581(d)).
9. Id. With respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the Office of Public
Attorney, the Public Attorney would be authorized to exercise all powers in the conduct
of criminal investigations, prosecutions, civil proceedings, and appeals as the Attorney
General would have, including the authority to issue instructions to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Id. (proposed § 583).
10. Id. (proposed § 582). New § 584 would require the Public Attorney to provide
the Attorney General with five days written notice prior to signing or filing any
indictment of criminal information, and it permits the Attorney General to appear
amicus curiae if he "disapproves." If enacted, this section would place the Justice
Department in the unusual position of a quasi-public defender vis-t-vis defendants being
prosecuted by the Public Attorney.
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founded, of course, in the general dissatisfaction with the speed and effec-
tiveness of the original Department of Justice investigation and prosecution
of the June 17, 1972, Watergate break-in, and subsequent cover-up," and
in the aftermath of the "Saturday Night Massacre," which resulted in the
firing of the Director of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, Archibald
Cox, and in the resignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and
Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus. 12
The latter event inspired a bevy of legislation designed to provide
statutory independence for the new Watergate Special Prosecutor. These
included the Hart-Bayh bill which provided for the appointment of a
Watergate Special Prosecutor by a three-judge panel of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, with removal by the panel for
gross impropriety, dereliction of duty, or incapacity;' 3 a Taft-Hruska bill
which provided for appointment of the Special Prosecutor by the Attorney
General, with the Attorney General agreeing not to appoint anyone whom
the Senate disapproves by a resolution, and with removal by the Attorney
General for cause; 14 and -the Percy-Baker bill which provided for appoint-
ment of the Special Prosecutor by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and for removal by the President for cause, with
dismissal to become effective thirty days after delivery to Congress of notice
thereof. 15 After extensive discussion and committee consideration, these
11. See generally Hearings on the Nomination of Earl I. Silbert to be United States
Attorney, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 and 2
(1974) and 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
12. Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox was appointed by Attorney General Elliot
Richardson under the Attorney General's statutory authority to appoint subordinate
officers to assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities. 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515,
533 (1970). The charter under which Mr. Cox was to operate was published as an
Order of the Attorney General and stated that the Special Prosecutor could be dismissed
only for "extraordinary improprieties." 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.37- .38 (1975). On Oct. 20, 1973,
Mr. Cox was dismissed upon the order of the President (after Attorney General Elliot
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus had resigned) for
refusing to compromise his efforts to secure access to the White House tapes by judicial
process. The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia subsequently held that
Mr. Cox's dismissal, "in the absence of a finding of extraordinary impropriety was in
clear violation of an existing Justice Department regulation having the force of law and
was therefore illegal." Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1974).
Mr. Leon Jaworski, who succeeded Mr. Cox, was appointed under a similar regulation.
28 C.F.R. §§ 0.37-.38 (1975), as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32805 (1973). See United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 n.8 (1974). See generally Hearings Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm. on the Special Prosecutor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 and 2 (1973).
13. Independent Special Prosecutor Act of 1973, S. 2611, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), reported without recommendation, S. REP. 93-595, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (Dec. 3,
1973), ordered placed under subjects on the table (July 25, 1974). This bill enjoyed the
sponsorship of fifty-four members of the Senate. For an argumentative comparison of its
provisions with the Taft-Hruska and Percy-Baker proposals, see 119 CONM. REc. S
21,832 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1973) (remarks of Senator Philip A. Hart).
14. Independent Special Prosecutor Act of 1973, S. 2642, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), reported without recommendation, S. REP. No. 93-596, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(Dec. 3, 1973), ordered placed under subjects on the table (July 24, 1974). For a
memorandum of law prepared by Senator Taft in support of S. 2642, see 119 CONG. REC.
S 21,255 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1973).
15. Independent Special Prosecutor Act of 1973, S. 2734, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). This bill subsequently was reintroduced as Amends. Nos. 850 and 851, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (amendments in the nature of substitutes for S. 2642 (Taft-
Hruska) and S. 2611 (Hart-Bayh), respectively). For an analysis and accompanying
memorandum of law prepared by Senator Charles Percy in support of S. 2734 see 119
CONG. REc. S 21,487 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1973).
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three proposals were scheduled to be considered on the floor of the Senate
during the second week of December 1973,16 and a unanimous consent
agreement was effected by the Senate leadership allocating debate time
amongst the proponents of -the three measures. 7 As it became increasingly
apparent, however, that all three proposals possessed potential constitutional
or practical infirmities' s which might vitiate or delay prosecutions and
litigation then being conducted by the Watergate Special Prosecutor, Senate
consideration of statutorily creating an independent Watergate Special Prose-
cutor was put aside and never resumed.
Thus, almost two years later, a proposal for a judicially appointed inde-
pendent special (i.e., public) prosecutor has reemerged 9 in S. 495-
although the S. 495 variety is permanent and possessory of much broader
jurisdiction.20 As was the case both during consideration of the aforemen-
tioned Hart-Bayh proposal 2 and in the deliberations of the Senate Water-
gate Committee in formulating its final report,22 -this writer is unable to
support, as a matter of policy and law, the proposal in section 101 of S. 495
to establish an independent, judicially appointed Office of Public Attorney.
II. SENATE BILL 495 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM
The constitutional concept of "separation of powers" is characterized by
the conscious ambiguity and delicate imprecision at which the framers of the
Constitution were so adept. Similarly, the question of whether Congress,
consistent with the Constitution, can statutorily reallocate the appointment
and supervision of a public prosecutor of government oriented crimes from
the executive branch to the judiciary is fraught with uncertainty. 23 Neverthe-
less, because article II, section 1, provides that the "executive Power shall be
vested in a President" 24 and article II, section 3, directs that the President
1
16. See 119 CONG. REc. S 22,254 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1973).
17. See id. S 22,257.
18. Cf. S. Rap. No. 93-595, supra note 13; S. REP. No. 93-596, supra note 14; notes
13-15 supra.
19. There was not a complete two-year hiatus in Senate committee consideration of
this issue. See Hearings on S. 2803 & S. 2979, Removing Politics from the Administra-
tion of Justice, Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Subcomm.
Chairman).
20. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
21. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
22. See S. REP. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1105 (1974) (individual views of
Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.); note 3 supra.
23. Former Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold, with reference to § 101 of S. 495,
has stated:
The question of constitutionality of some of the provisions of S. 495 is a
close and difficult one, at best. No one can give a definitive answer to it,
except the Supreme Court. In many other areas, an opinion of counsel
can be advanced on a question, even one of constitutional law, with con-
siderable confidence. I do not believe that this is the case here. It is not
irrelevant to point out that the most recent decisions of the Supreme Court
on the closely related question of standing to sue were reached by 5-4 or
6-3 decisions in the Court. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
PERSPECTIVES ON S. 495, at 81.
24. U. S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
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"shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, '25 it is submitted that
the prosecutorial function is the exclusive province of the executive branch.
Secondly, although it is arguable that under article II, section 2, clause 2,
Congress conceivably could vest the power to appoint a public attorney in
the "Courts of Law,"'26 an official exercising the prosecutorial and investiga-
tive authorities of a public prosecutor constitutionally must function as an
officer of the executive branch, and, therefore, is subjeot to Presidential
direction and control. Third, the President constitutionally may be vested
with authority :to remove a public attorney-at least for cause. Thus, the
fundamental objection to the creation of the Office of Public Attorney as
provided in S. 495 is that such a scheme constitutes a direct impingement
upon traditional separation of powers tenets.
Admittedly, the Constitution does not create analytically precise or rigidly
segregated categories of governmental function amongst the three branches;
there are areas of overlap and shared responsibilities arising from a system
of checks and balances. 27 On the other hand, the coupling of the vesting of
the "executive Power," under article .I, section 1, and the charge, under
article II, section 3, that the President shall "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed," seemingly delineates an immutable area of executive
responsibility, that is, enforcement of the laws, which would be revocable
only by constitutional amendment. 28 A statement made by James Madison,
while serving as a representative in the first United States Congress, supports
this assertion: "I conceive that if any power whatsoever is in the nature of
25. Id. art. II, § 3.
26. Id. art. II, § 2 states in part: "but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
27. Madison argued that the branches were to have partial agency in and some
control over the acts of each other. The framers had acted on the principle, he
contended, "that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim
requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained."
THE FEDERALIST No. 48[47], at 327 (P. Ford ed. 1898) (J. Madison). Similarly, in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Justice Jackson,
concurring, stated: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity." 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). But see Springer v. Phillipine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926),
wherein wrote Chief Justice Taft:
mhe Constitution was so framed as to vest in the Congress all legislative
powers therein granted, to vest in the President the executive power, and
to vest in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress might
establish, the judicial power. From this division on principle, the rea-
sonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should
be kept separate in all cases in which they are not expressly blended, and
the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it af-
firmatively requires.
Id. at 116.
28. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 178-82,
194-95 (4th rev. ed. 1957) for a recital of the argument that the vesting of "the executive
Power" was an affirmative grant of power and that the subsequent, more precise grants,
except when coupled with express restrictions or limitations, serve to interpret the
general grant of power. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that article I, § 1 confers all "executive" power minus only what is specifically
excepted. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
1975]
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the executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing and controlling those
who execute the laws."'29
Although distinguishable from a potential challenge to the provisions of S.
495, numerous decisions have ruled that the prosecution of offenses against
the United States is an executive function and, in accordance with separation
of powers, cannot be exercised either 'by the judiciary or by the legislature.30
In Ponzi v. Fessenden3 ' the Supreme Court ruled that the faithful execution
clause of article II makes clear that the President is vested with the federal
prosecutorial authority, stating that: "The Attorney General is the head of
the Department of Justice . . . . He is the hand of the President in taking
care that the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of the
United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offences, be
faithfully executed. ' 32 A similar decision was reached by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cox,3 3 where the court ruled
that a United States Attorney cannot be required by the district court to sign
an indictment initiating the prosecution of federal offenses. Reiterating the
"hand of the President" principle of Ponzi, the court in Cox declared that the
United States Attorney was "an executive official of the government" when
exercising the discretion as to whether or not to prosecute a particular
case. 34 The court then found "as an incident of the constitutional separation
of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the
discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States .* . *,
Furthermore, in United States v. Nixon36 the Supreme Court, in conclud-
ing that the Special Prosecutor possessed sufficient standing 'to bring an
action to enforce the tapes subpoena against the President, explicitly ac-
knowledged that the power being exercised by the Special Prosecutor was the
executive power under article II to conduct the criminal litigation of the
United States, which had been vested in the Attorney General 37 and then
delegated in part to the Special Prosecutor. 8 As has been stated by former
Counsel to the Special Prosecutor Philip Lacovara:
29. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 481-82 (1789).
30. See, e.g., Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868); Smith v. United
States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967); in re Grand Jury January 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662
(D. Md. 1970); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
31. 258 U.S. 254 (1922); accord, Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The Court in
Springer found that the executive function includes "the authority . . . to enforce [laws]
or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement." 277 U.S. at 202
(emphasis added). See also 2 O'. ATr'y GEN. 482, 487-93 (1831).
32. 258 U.S. at 262.
33. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
34. 342 F.2d at 171.
35. Id.; accord, Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The
court of appeals held that the lower court possessed no authority to review prosecutorial
decisions as the "Constitution places on the Executive the duty to see that the 'laws are
faithfully executed' and the responsibility must reside with that power." 382 F.2d at 482
n.9.
36. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970).
38. 418 U.S. at 694 n.8. The "independence" of the Watergate Special Prosecutor as
upheld in the case depended upon the existence of regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General which had the force of law. Id. at 695-96.
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[Ilt was always implicit in the arguments submitted [to the Court] . . .
that the President had the ultimate constitutional responsibility to take
care that the laws were faithfully executed. We argued only that Con-
gress could authorize that function to be exercised by subordinate
Executive officials . . . and that they are free to pursue this responsi-
bility ... only until the President chooses to exercise his ultimate con-
stitutional power to remove the subordinate from office . . .9
The decision in United States v. Nixon also complements a line of cases
beginning with Myers v. United States4" and ending with Wiener v. United
States,41 recognizing that purely executive functions, that is, the irreducible
powers conferred upon the President by article II, must be performed under
the direction of the President. In other words, the article II executive power,
which includes the faithful execution of the laws, is exercisable only by the
President and his subordinate executive officers, and, therefore, constitution-
ally cannot be allocated by Congress to independent agencies. 42 It is only
those "executive" tasks which are merely incidental to the quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial responsibilities delegated to independent agencies which
constitutionally can be delegated to such agencies by Congress. 43 The
Watergate Special Prosecutor in United States v. Nixon was a subordinate of
the Attorney General, and hence of the ,President, and was exercising an ex-
clusive article II power in prosecuting criminal offenses against the United
States-a power which, according to the rationale of Myers and Wisner,
could not be exercised by an independent agent. In short, the Myers line of
cases recognized that article II power could be exercised only by the President
and his subordinates, and correspondingly, implicit in United States v. Nixon
is the proposition that the special prosecutor was a subordinate executive
officer under the ultimate authority of the President and was not independ-
ent per se of the executive branch.
The decisions in the Myers line of cases clearly support the proposi-
tion that the executive power can be exercised only by purely executive
officers subject to Presidential control. In Myers the Supreme Court affirmed
the power of the President ,to remove a postmaster from office. The opinion
in Myers, delivered by Chief Justice Taft, asserted that the vesting of the
"executive power" in the President implied a broad, inherent constitutional
power to remove officials appointed by 'the President, no matter what
restrictions Congress may have imposed regarding the nature of their
tenure.44 In the second of this series of three cases dealing with the power of
the President to remove government employees, the Court in Humphrey's
Executor v. United States45 limited the reach of Myers in overturning a
39. PERsPEcrIVs ON S. 495, at 113.
40. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
41. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
42. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
43. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); note 46 infra
and accompanying text.
44. 272 U.S. at 163-64.
45. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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dismissal by the President of a member of the Federal Trade Commission
who had been removed from office for personal and political reasons, and
not for any of the causes statutorily specified by Congress. Finding that the
FTC "cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or eye of the
executive,"' 46 the Court in Humphrey's confined the Myers holding to
"purely Executive officers," stating that Myers "goes no farther;-much less
does it include an officer who occupies no place in the executive department
and who exercises no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution
in the President.'47
Twenty-four years later, the Court in Wiener defined Humphrey's as
drawing "a sharp line of cleavage between officials who were part of the
Executive establishment and were thus removable by virtue of the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers, and those who are members of a body 'to
exercise its judgment without the leave or hinderance of any other official or
any other department of the government.' "48
While undoubtedly restricting the reach of Myers as to the President's
power to remove independent regulatory agency personnel, both Humphrey's
and Wiener are compatible with the premise that the President's obligation to
see to the faithful execution of the laws is a "purely Executive" function, as
to which the President constitutionally must possess authority to supervise the
performance of subordinate officers exercising -the executive power for which
the President is ultimately accountable. 40 Although it is perhaps arguable
that under Humphrey's and Wiener Congress could limit or control the
authority of the President to remove a Public Attorney, 50 the distinctions
46. Id. at 628. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sutherland observed that
"[t]o the extent that [the FTC] exercises any executive function-as distinguished
from the executive power in the constitutional sense-it does so in the discharge and
effectuation of its quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers, or as an agency of the
legislative or judicial departments of the government." Id. (emphasis added). With
respect to the determination of the Humphrey's Court that the FTC was not "an arm or
eye of the executive," compare the statement in Ponzi that the Department of Justice "is
the hand of the President in taking care that the laws . ..be faithfully executed." 258
U.S. at 262; see notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
47. 295 U.S. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
48. 357 U.S. at 353.
49. The Court in Humphrey's, in finding that the President's arbitrary attempt to
remove the FTC Commissioner exerted a "coercive influence" on the independence of an
agency "not only wholly disconnected from the executive department, but . . . an agency
of the legislative and judicial departments," 295 U.S. at 630, stated that:
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general de-
partments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influ-
ence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and
is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in the very fact of
the separation of powers of these departments by the Constitution; and in
the rule which recognizes their essential co-equality. The sound applica-
tion of a principle that makes one master in his own house precludes him
from imposing his control in the house of another who is master there.
Id. at 629-30.
Obviously, this principle would operate in turn to bar a legislative or judicial attempt to
influence or control the independence of the executive branch within its own sphere. See
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880).
50. Cf. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973), discussed at note 12 supra,
where the court stated:
As an appointee of the Attorney General, [Special Prosecutor] Cox served
subject to congressional rather than Presidential control. . . . The At-
torney General derived his authority to hire Mr. Cox and to fix his term
of service from various Acts of Congress. Congress therefore had the
[Vol. 29
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made in these cases between "purely Executive" personnel performing
"Executive functions"' and those occupying "no place in the Executive
Department" and who exercise "no part of the Executive power" 52 indicate
that a Public Attorney, responsible for enforcement of -the laws of the United
States, an admitted executive responsibility, must be accountable to the
President, and arguably subject to removal by the President as a subordinate
executive officer. 53
In addition to the argument that the establishment of an independent
judicially appointed Public Attorney constitutes an unconstitutional usurpa-
tion of executive power, it can be argued that the constitutional validity of
vesting the appointment of Public Attorney with three retired court of
appeals judges54 is far from clear. The authority for judicial appointment of
the Public Attorney is based, as mentioned previously, upon article II,
section 2, clause 2, providing that ". . . Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers . . .in the Courts of Law . . . ,55 S.
495, however, provides for vesting the appointment of the Public Attorney in
an ad hoc group of retired court of appeals judges, as opposed to a court of
law, and such a group of judges may not constitute a court of law within the
meaning of the Constitution. 56 Prior instances in which Congress authorized
judicial appointment of inferior officers involved the vesting of appointment
power in a formally established court, possessing a defined identity.57 Conse-
quently, a defendant challenging a prosecution undertaken by a Public
Attorney appointed under the provisions of S. 495 could utilize the potential-
power directly to limit the circumstances under which Mr. Cox could be
discharged ....
366 F. Supp. at 107-08. See also 119 CONG. REC. S 21,490-91 (daily ed. Nov. 30,
1973) (Senator Percy's memorandum of law).
51. See 295 U.S. at 627-28; notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
53. It is important to note that while the Senate Watergate Committee report stated
that the "Public Attorney could be removed only by the three retired circuit court judges
and only upon a finding of gross improprieties," S. REP. No. 93-981, supra note 2, at
100, S. 495 is silent on the question of removal. Presumably, only through resort to
impeachment could the Public Attorney be removed from office under S. 495. But see Ex
parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839), holding that the power to remove, in the
absence of a contrary provision, accompanies the power to appoint.
Furthermore, the question of removal cannot be isolated from the threshold constitu-
tional considerations of appointment. Removal necessarily implies a relationship to
direction and control. That is to say, if a Public Attorney is absolutely immune from
removal by the President or the Attorney General, in reality there would be no reporting
or control responsibility in the executive branch, and, thus, the same separation of
powers conflicts need be considered as are discussed with respect to placement of an
"executive" functionary outside the executive branch. See generally Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
54. The legal designation for retired judges of the circuit courts of appeals is "senior
circuit judges." See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
55. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
56. A similar question was raised when Congress in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch.
176, § 3, 14 Stat. 517, 518, delegated to the Chief Justice of the United States the power
to nominate registers in bankruptcy for the district judges to appoint. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1011 (1867).
57. See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880);
Birch v. Steele, 165 F. 577 (5th Cir. 1908); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902
(D.D.C. 1967); United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Russell v.
Thomas, 21 Fed. Cas. 58 (No. 12,162) (E.D. Pa. 1874).
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ly telling argument that the power of appointment had not been vested
constitutionally in a "court of law."58
Finally, assuming that the appointment powers are vested in a constitu-
tionally proper "court of law," the broader question remains as to whether
article II, section 2, encompasses the congressional authorization of an
appointment of a prosecutor by a court. The most relevant case is United
States v. Solomon,59 holding that article II, section 2, permits a federal
district court, pursuant to statute,60 to appoint a United States Attorney
when a vacancy occurs, effective until the vacancy is filled by the President.
Relying on the language of article II and of Ex parte Siebold,61 the court
found no infringement upon the separation of powers doctrine. The court in
Solomon carefully noted, however, that 'the judicial appointment was tempo-
rary and that it did not bind the President, who had the power to displace
the judicial appointee with a nominee of his choosing at any time.6 2
A comparable decision, also sharply limited, was reached in Hobson v.
Hansen, 3 where the court upheld the validity of a provision of a District of
Columbia statute requiring the members of the District of Columbia Board
of Education to be appointed by the judges of the Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia. Significantly, the court relied upon the unique dual
character of the District of Columbia courts and upon the special constitu-
tional powers granted Congress over District of Columbia affairs.6 4 More-
58. Although perhaps less problematic, there exists the question of whether a Public
Attorney, being the pro tanto possessory of plenary powers and significant responsibili-
ties currently held by the Attorney General and the President, constitutes an "inferior
officer" within the meaning of article II, § 2, cl. 2. The question of what officers are
"inferior" within the meaning of this provision has never been adjudicated by the
Supreme Court. The term seems to suggest officers intended to be subordinate to those in
whom their appointment is vested, and at the same time, to exclude the courts of law and
the heads of departments. See Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10, (1878). A substantial argument can be made
that this clause was intended to permit Congress to relieve the President of the burden of
appointing all inferior and unimportant executive and judicial officers in whom the
President's interest would be minimal. The office of Public Attorney clearly would not
fall within such a category.
59. 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 546 (1970).
61. 100 U.S. 371 (1880). In Ex parte Siebold the Court upheld a federal statute
which provided that circuit courts appoint special deputy supervisors for congressional
elections. The Supreme Court's opinion was based on the fact that the appointment of
the supervisors in question could not have been with equal propriety or convenience
assigned to any other official. Geographic proximity and necessity for quick action in
appointing local election supervisors justified placing the appointing power in a local
federal court. The Court further stated, however, that:
It is, no doubt, usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior offi-
cers in that department of the government, executive or judicial, or in that
particular executive department to which the duties of such officer apper-
tain. But there is no absolute requirement to this effect in the Constitu-
tion; . . . and in the present case there is no such incongruity in the duty
required as to excuse the courts from its performance or to render their
acts void.
Id. at 397-98.
The Siebold decision is often cited as supporting the constitutionality of judicial appoint-
ment of a Public Attorney. See S. REP. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1974).
62. 216 F. Supp. at 842-43. The court emphasized that the removal power was with
the President and not the court. Id. at 843. S. 495 is silent on removal of the Public
Attorney. See note 53 supra.
63. 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967).
64. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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over, the court stressed that the power to appoint involved no supervisory
responsibilities and acknowledged that if the court possessed the authoriza-
tion to administer the schools, it would constitute "such incongruity in the
duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance or to render acts
void." 65
The "incongruity in the duty" that would be cast by S. 495 upon the panel
of senior circuit judges, as well as their mentor, the Chief Justice, might
prove substantial. Rejecting the proposals to vest the appointment of a
Watergate Special Prosecutor in the District Court of the District of Colum-
bia, 60 Judge Gesell, in Nader v. Bork6 7 commented:
The suggestion that the judiciary be given responsibility for the appoint-
ment and supervision of a new Watergate Special Prosecutor, for
example, is most unfortunate. . . . The Courts must remain neutral.
Their duties are not prosecutorial. If Congress feels that laws should be
enacted to prevent Executive interference with the Watergate Special
Prosecutor, the solution lies in legislation enhancing and protecting that
office as it is now established and not by following a course that places
incompatible duties upon this particular Court. As Judge Learned
Hand warned in United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir.
1945): 'prosecution and judgment are two quite separate functions
in the administration of justice; they must not merge.' 68
In summary, the precepts of separation of powers and the constitutional
vesting in the Executive of the exclusive authority and responsibility to
faithfully execute ,the laws of the United States necessarily lead this writer to
conclude that an officer exercising the powers and jurisdiction of the
proposed Public Attorney cannot be set apart from the executive branch and
inherently is subject to Presidential direction and control, perhaps including
65. 265 F. Supp. at 913, quoting Ex parte Siebold 100 U.S. 371 (1880). For further
discussion of Ex parte Siebold see note 61 supra.
Although both Siebold and Hobson vested in the courts appointments to "executive"
positions, neither case represented an encroachment, much less one of major proportions,
upon a central responsibility of the executive branch-the faithful execution of the law.
66. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
67. 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
68. Id. at 109. Additional force was provided Judge Gesell's observation by a
communication from Chief Judge John J. Sirica to Senator James 0. Eastland,
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating that "personally, I am in agreement
with Judge Gesell's statement" and that "eight of our judges . . . remarked that he
disapproves of a procedure that would require this court to appoint a special prosecutor."
Letter dated November 15, 1973, reprinted in S. REP. No. 93-596, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
25 (1973).
Furthermore, it was contended in Solomon that the merging of the power to appoint,
coupled with a concomitant authority to remove the United States Attorney, created a
nexus between judge and prosecutor too close to satisfy due process. The court rejected
the argument by finding that the removal power was left to the President. 216 F. Supp. at
843. Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
(1926). As has been previously stated, S. 495 is silent as to removal of the Public
Attorney. See note 53 supra. The power to appoint, in the absence of specific instructions
to the contrary, could be construed as vesting an attendant power to remove the Public
Attorney. See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839) (upholding the legality of
the removal from office by a district court of its clerk, appointed by it). So construed,
the nexus between the court (through the panel of retired judges and indirectly the Chief
Justice) and the prosecutorial function may be too close to satisfy standards of due
process. However, under S. 495, proposed new § 581(d) bars the retired judges from




the unrestricted power to dismiss from office. Secondly, while it is unclear
whether the courts would uphold the appointment of a Public Attorney by a
"Court of Law" pursuant to congressional authorization, the very nature of
the article II executive power to be exercised by -the Public Attorney
indicates that the President, nevertheless, must retain a modicum of authority
to supervise a Public Attorney appointed under the alternative means
provided by article II, section 2, clause 2. Third, the proposed judicial
appointment of the Public Attorney under article II, section 2, faces
sufficient legal uncertainty so as to mandate the development of a more
constitutionally certain reform, designed to increase the capacity of -the
federal government to prosecute and investigate governmental crime.69
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE
Pursuant to a suggestion made by former Solicitor General Erwin Gris-
wold,70 Senator Charles H. Percy and this writer have introduced an
amendment to S. 495 which would replace section 101 of the bill with a
proposal to create within the Department of Justice a new Division of
Government Crimes,7 ' under the supervision of an Assistant Attorney
General for Government Crimes to be appointed by the President, subject to
the advice and consent of the Senate. Under this amendment, the Assistant
Attorney General for Government Crimes would have jurisdiction equivalent
to that given the Public Attorney under S. 495,72 and, in addition, would
have jurisdiction over alleged violations of federal law by members of
Congress, congressional staff, and the federal judiciary. 73
Under the Percy-Baker amendment the Assistant Attorney General for
69. Furthermore, there are substantial policy considerations which mandate against
an independent judicially appointed Public Attorney. S. 495, as currently written, would
establish a virtually inviolate fourth branch of government, and would substantially
diminish the accountability of law enforcement officials to the President, the Congress,
and the American people. Insulation of the administration of justice from partisan
politics clearly is desirable; however, insulation from the political process and public
opinion is not. See, e.g., PERSPECrIVES ON S. 495, at 71-72 (reply of Thomas Ehrlich),
74-90 (reply of Erwin Griswold), 107-24 (reply of Philip Lacovara); Watergate Special
Prosecution Force Report 137-140 (October, 1975) (For sale by the U.S. Government
Printing Office). The Watergate Special Prosecution Force concluded its 28 month
investigation by recommending, inter alia, against the creation of a permanent Special
Prosecutor because only in "extraordinary situations such as 'Watergate,' [can] an inde-
pendent prosecutor . . . be held accountable directly to the public . . . [as] his actions
are subject to intense and continuous press scrutiny," id. at 138; because "there is no
reason to believe that a permanent special prosecutor's office would be immune from
the rigidity that comes over most organizations," id.; and because "different policies
[between the Justice Department and a special prosecutor] easily lead to unequal jus-
tice . . . and provide great potential for a special prosecutor's abuse of power." Id. at
139. In the alternative, the Report recommended an expanded section within the Crim-
inat Division, "or, similar to the proposal of Senators Baker and Percy . . . a new
Division of Government Crimes .... "Id. See notes 70-74 infra, and accompanying
text.
70. Id. at 88-89.
71. Amend. No. 813, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
72. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
73. Proposed new § 528 of title 28 U.S.C. states in part that "the Assistant
Attorney General shall have jurisdiction . . . (1) with respect to any matter as to which
there is reasonable cause to believe involves the violation of any Federal law by any
Government officer or employee, whether elected or appointed .... " Amend. No. 13,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (emphasis added). Compare S. 495, proposed § 582.
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Government Crimes would be vested with the full investigative and prosecu-
torial powers of the Department of Justice, subject to the ultimate authority
of the Attorney General. The amendment specifies that the Attorney Gener-
al must report promptly to the Congress any instance in which he overrules
any action taken or proposed to be taken by the Division of Government
Crimes. Furthermore, should the Assistant Attorney General for Govern-
ment Crimes be removed from office, the Attorney General is required to
report in writing to the Congress the precise reasons for such removal' 4
By vesting the authority and responsibility to investigate and prosecute
allegations of violations of law by governmental officials and violations of
federal campaign law in a subordinate executive officer appointed by the
President, the Percy-Baker amendment clearly avoids the separation of
powers problems inherent in S. 495. Moreover, the establishment of a
Division of Government Crimes would provide an institutional arrangement
clearly lacking in the original Department of Justice Watergate investigation.
Finally, requiring reports to Congress of instances in which the Government
Crimes Division is overruled by the Attorney General and the requirement
of a full report in the event of the dismissal of the Assistant Attorney
General for Government Crimes, provide a rather substantial safeguard
against efforts to distort the legal process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, one of the most grievous institutional deficiencies revealed by
Watergate-this is, the absence within the Department of Justice of a
division solely and specifically entrusted with the mandate and requisite
authority to investigate allegations of official misconduct-remains extant.7 5
Reform, in whatever fashion it assumes, must be effected calmly and
dispassionately. For the remedy could be as damaging as the malady if, as a
result of Watergate, legislation were enacted that violated the basic plan of
the Constitution, eroded the doctrine of separation of powers, diffused public
accountability, or substantially impaired the ability of the President of the
United States to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities. As was stated by
Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:76  "The
tendency is strong to emphasize the transient result on policies . . .and lose
sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced power and structure of
our Republic."'77
74. Precedent for Presidential appointment of a public prosecutor is found in the
congressional reaction to the "Teapot Dome" scandal, involving allegations of personal
enrichment and violation of law during the Harding Administration. A joint resolution
passed by both Houses provided that "the President is further Authorized and Directed to
Appoint, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, Special Counsel who Shall
Have Charge and Control of the Prosecution of Such Litigation. . . ." S.J. Res. 54, Feb.
8, 1924, ch. 16, 43 Stat. 5.
75. Cf. S. REP. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1105-06 (1973).
76. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See also J. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITEa STATES 34 (1859), quoting Alexander Hamilton: "Nothing is more common
than for a free people, in times of confusion and violence, to gratify momentary passions,
by letting into government principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to
themselves."
77. 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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